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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No.
14582

-vsLAWRENCE H. ALLMENDINGER,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDBWl'

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIS~Cf
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAD COURTY 1 STAft
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE BRYANT B. CRDF'l',
JUDGE, PRESIDING

VERNON B. ROMNEY

Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT

Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah

84114

Attorneys for Respondent
LARRY R.

KELLER

Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
343 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Appellant
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ordered to show cause as to why probation should not
be revoked.

Appellant moved to dismiss the Order to

Show Cause on the grounds that the court lost jurisdiction
over appellant after six months, 1·1hich is the m<n:inum
The Court denied the ~:otion.

sentence for possession.

RELIEF SOGGHT ON lU'PEl\L
Respondent asks this Court to affirm the
decision of the lower court.
STATEllENT OF FI,CTS
(See Disposition in the Lower Court)
ARC;UHENT
POilJT I
THE:

~: ~: lc

C'Jl

"

T.CTED CC::LL l?ITHTtJ

ST,'.'l'l'~'Ol'J

LY

]'i'LSCI' I f;J:I.

,\'

1nt contencls thvt thc·rc

j c;

no

st~l.uu,r\·

.:ut'

_fol:

scribed by the legislature for imprisonr.1cnt for
Respondent replies th:;t the UtaL Coc1"' :;pee if j
for extentions of
linits.

prol:J:~tion

Furtherr:10re,

.::1 l i

Ccl '. '·,·

[. 1-u·: ~

beyond Da):j_:c•.un irnpri:;rq:·· :.t

the Utilh stet~utcc i:~ v<·ry :-; ::

.j

1

r

~c·

most other state and fedcrc•l statut(·:: in tlli:: r• .,,, ·t.
The Utah la1·1 also p.:,ra llccls stancletrd::

·;uqr 1.

; l , .. J l
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1\mcrican B.1r Association and the Model Penal Code.
finally, respondent sutmits that several very important
policy

co~sidcrations

are satisfied by the Utah statute.

Therefore, respondent asks this Court to affirm the
decision of the district court.
Contrary to appellant's assertion that there
is no authcril; for extending a probation period beyond
a c1o.x imur,\ prison scntc;nce, the Utah Code Annotated,
§

77-35-17

reads:

(1953)

"Upo:. a plea of guilty or conviction of any crime or offense, if
1t appe3rs corpatible with the
~~ulic interest, the court having
Jurisdiction ray suspend the imposition
c.r lhe execution of sentence and may
;.Lace tr.e dcfer:dant on probation for
~uch period of time as the court Shall

ClCterinir.e.
The court m.1y subsequently increase
or decrease the probation period, and
may revo::c or modify any condition
(_l :....

~

: ,-, .....

~on

ion

U[oC :1

rc'quir L:cl."

! ,!_
Li1c

"any rc

§

')8-37-8 (10), which

3sessing marijuana, among other

,Lties

~rot.,'-' t

Colle,

e

Jurt may place a defendant on

or

· le terms and conditions as may

Obviously, the legislature intended to give

courts a <JreJt cle2l of uiscretion in granting probation.
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important flexibility in the administration of this
humane perogative.

The court may set the duration of

probation and also modify any conditions thereof.

This

is consistant with the overall policy of the Utah
Criminal Code as expressed in Utah Code Annotated
§

76-l-104 (as amended 1975):
"The provisions of this code
shall be construed in accordance
with these general principles:
(3)
prescribe penalties.
. which
permit recognition of difference in
rehabilitation possibilities among
indlvidual offenders."
(Emphasis
added)

As will be der.1onstrated, infra p. 7 , there are

~c:ny

important re2sons for a court to have broad discretion
when dealing \'i':", so
other states
visions

rr:~·.

r;c.~1y

different people.

~~is

NurnProus

need, as their code pro-

demons~rate.

probation for whatevEr period as they deem hest
§

16-ll-202).

(C.R.S.

Other _;,_at,·:o allov1 the trial court to se>t

probation Hithin some out. i.de limit that ho.s nothi.nq to
do with the possible incarceration limits.

In Ncvado.,

for example, probation may be extended for as long as
five years (NRS 176.215).

Hawaii, like Nevada places

no less than a five year limit on probation,

(:'JC'I1

fnr
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misdemeanors

(HRS,

§

711-77).

to extend up to two years

Oklahoma permits probation

(OSA 22

§

99lc).

Some states have different probation period
limitations depending on l·:hether tl:e defendant vras convictcd of a felony or a misdemeanor.

Kansc.s specifies

five years for felonies and two years for misdemeanors.
Furthermore,

y~ars

additional
statute,

felony probation may be later extended five
and misdeDeanor probation two.

howe~cr,

goes on to provide that, in any case,
p~st

felony probation can not be extended
lir1it

L:u~sas

In

car' .. inc:trccration
J,

is·.·.

the sentence

Obviously the same is not true for

(;:Si\ 21-4611).

r.1isJeoceanors.

The

a nisder.eanant may receive only

(YS.'\ 21-4502).

There!'ore,

i"

ilnant r:.:Jy be placed on p:-ob,, tion fer uro yeilrs original and two years extension)
·.;ircum se:nt·:nce limit.

u ..

Kansas.

up to

t~o:o

years

plac~d

cilnant way be

1 .i.su~__,

i\

on probation for

(IC 19-2601(7)) although the maximum
inprisonment

sentence is six mont
goc·s e:v.:_n further.
only Le: incarce:ratc~

(IC 18-113).

California

1:1 tl1.:1t state .:. misdemeanant 1-:ho could

.or 90 days ~ay be placed on proba-

tion for

.:!:>

lone; a;: thrc'e J'L'ars

S l203CJ.)

and PL·op_ly v.

llec,l!l,

(CAlifornia Pen<.il Code,

72 Cill. Rptr.

457

(1968)).
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Oregon has an interesting statute.

In that

state, a defendant may not be placed on probation for
less than a year (ORS 137.010).

Obviously the Oregon

legislature feels that probation for less than a year
is ineffective.
Of all the western states

1

only Arizona, New

Mexico and Washington restrict probation by the maYinum
length of sentence (ARS 13-1657, NMSA 40A-29-l9 and
RCvl 9 • 9 5 • 2 0 0 ) •

Federal statutes (18 USC § 3651) provide for an
extended probation period and have been supporteu by
the United States Supreme Court in a line of cases,
primary of which is Frank v. United States, 395 U.S.
H 7,
~lr.

2 3 L . Ed . 1 -'
Ju:;t=icc :I

I 62 ,
~ll

11

l'

8 9 S . Ct .
s~i~,

1 5 03

(l 9 6 9 ) .

In Fran!:,

for the Court:

-: ::tl2_c.·.' ~_,is~ i; i ·_,_:r r-_
;__·c: l.mposed for otherv;i_c;e

,

petty offenses.
For exanl;Jle, under
federal law, most offenders may be
placed on probation for up to five
years in lieu of or, in certain
cases, in addition to a term of
imprisonment.

*

*

*

Therefore, the ~aximun penalty
authorized in petty offense cases
1

Includes Hawaii, Washington, Oregon, C~ljfo•ni~,
IdahC:, ~tah, llevada, Arizona, 1·1ontana, \"lyoming, Colori1ch•,
NeVI hexlco, Kansas and Oklahoma.
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is not simply six months imprisonment and a $500.00 fine.
A petty
offender may be placed on probation
for up to five years and if the
terms of probation are violated, he
nay then be imprisoned for six
months."
Finally the American Bar Association has set
forth

s~ilar

Justice.

guidelines in its Standards for Criminal

The American Bar Association suggests two

years probation for a misdemeanor and up to five for a
felony
thee

0!,

21 Probation).

(Standards, p.
i

t:--:a t

1: 101.

to pr· .L_, ·_ ~--:
appro;-r L l t·
offense

the limits on the length of a sentence

-,;·,ould be determined independently of the
l c _:;th of a

(Standards, p.
Th~re

a trial

?he committee adds

prison sentence for the same
26).

are many good policy reasons for allowing

judge the discretion to extend probation for a

.cc~::: ..~;:~:::__!__e

lc_.~~-(Jch

of

t i_r.c.:

even if it r.LlY be for lonser tha.n

In his Memorandum Decision
Judge Crof._
in support

c;
c~

the lol.·_r ,-,,urt listed two strong reasons
probati<

e:.' ens ion.

First under Utah law

some jail ~cntences ca.· .ot exceed 90 days, as for a Class
C misderc.e:1nor

(Section 76-3-204 (3)).

perl

suc:1 1~.

pur:L~~-

~s

1

A probationary

ted duration hardly serves ar:y L'Seful

Ju .0c Cro{t pointed out:
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"It is misdemeanor type offenses
where probation is usually indicatcC
rather than a jail sentence, but if
the supervision of such a wrongdoer 1s
to be limited to the maxinum jail
sentence that can be served, probation in such cases becomes only a
gesture.
(R-76)
Judge Croft goes on to say:
. the court, when given tLe
alternative of a short jail sentence
or a short and thus useless probation
period, may well start imposing jail
sentences in those cases where proper
probationsupervision, if available,
may well steer a defendant away from
further criminal activity."
(Id.)
Judge Croft points out a second good reason for an
extended proLation period:
"The second reason why I do not
believe the law should or does require the limitation of a probation
period as contended by defendant
is ~hat, as in the case at bar,
c::C: c c ~ ->_ _ _ ln most cases, through
: - _iar,.::,

end

U_?

pl,~:vlil~ .l

__ ·eluded of fens'-',
tr2~Je~ •Y doing so in the belief
that a ~lea to the lesser offense
may mor li~ely result in consideration
for prot ,tj tJn.
If courts are to [,e
limited to :1 brief probation period,
courts re then placed in the position
of eith•r denying the plea to a lcss0r
included offense, or using jail
sentences as the only reasonable s0ntence remaining open to the court.
(R-76)
Probation is an attempt to give first offc·nC.:erc.
and some otl:ers a char.ce to demonstrate their ceq~.:.· it·,

to
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overco~e

their errors.

Another reason for an extension

of this prcgrilln ~ay Le demonstrated by a hypothetical case.
The accused is convicted and sentenced to probation and
papent of a fine as provided by Utah Code Annotated
§

77-35-17

(1953,

as amended).

Suppose the crime was

a misdemeanor with a penalty of six months in jail.
Further suppose the convicted man was unable to pay the
fine within the six months.

Under the law, as appellant

1-:ould have it, the man 1-:ould have to be thrown in jail.
The

~.0rc

h•_L'":'a;~e

the .: ,
ur:cl

~

1•

viev; 1:ould be to allol-l the trial judge
~o

L- ·'

:1

extend probation be;ond the six months
some additional time to make good his

ckb:.

Respondent strongly

;,~rges

the decision of the lo·.-.·er court.

special need for disc
f~ce

to fau.,

;,earinc_

the defendct: .. , and rc
and parole 1s in a mu

:ion.
u

·~

cv

this court to af::i:l11

Appellant •,:ould seek

A judge, viel-ling the defendant

1ssion from both sides concerning
g reports from adult probation

b· 'ter pc-sition to evaluate the

nee:ds of an 1:-.dividual than is the legislature.

The

legislature realized all this and thus specifically and
unccjJivicall:,· endm-:ec '--'1c trial courtv:ith broad

discrei~ion

v:luch rc.:c.,~or;~, nt asks t!ns court to sustain.
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Appellant alleges that there is ample authority
for his position that probation should be limited by
statutory sentencing provisions.

Respondent ansvers that

most of appellant's proffered authority is misapplied
and inapplicable to the instant question.

The rcDainder

simply demonstrates the rainority vie1·1.
Appellant said the general rule is stated in
21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law, § 555

(p.4 of Appellant's

brief).
"Where the suspension of imposition
of sentence is authorized, the court
. . . may, after such suspension, pronounce sentence at any time provided
the maximwu period for which sentence
could have been imposed or probation
9ranted has not elapsed."
A close reading of the rule, however, and of the case
cited as suppor"::ing th' rule demonstrate that ".
maxinum per- _·,·

which the court must ~ron0unce sentence.
nothing to do Hith th•

It has absolutely

SE:I,tence actually imposcc1 or

maxi..rnwu possible sentc·nce:.

In other Vlords, the rule

simply states that a court can't 11ait forever to ir-poo;c>
some kind of sentence, Vlhether it is ir.lprisonmcnt or
probation.

The rule has nothing to do Hith hov long

probation may continue if it is imposed.
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On page six of his brief appellant cites
In re Carroll, a Kansas case, as authority for his
position.

Respondent has already shown that Kansas law

allOI·IS probation to continue for up to four times the
maximwn incarceration period in the case of a_misdemeanor.
If Carroll were still good law there would be a contradiction.
long

sine~

Carroll, however, is a 1914 case and has
been overturned by legislative action.

!lp~lication

In

of Young, 201 Kan. 140, 439 P.2d 142 (1968),

the Suprel'le Court of Kansas explains:
"The parole authority of a police
court was considered in Carroll.
The statute then in effect (Laws
of 1909, Chap. 116, Sec. 2) Has
, ~amined and since it provided no
:.it on the ten'< of a parole granted
reunder, this court held that a
.ice court had no power to grant a
, 0le for a term longer than the
. ·:encc imposed.
. The statute
' c! C ' '-' _
,_:: C __ ' :
l ,C
~ _· .' : i Ei-:' J ll ','
.. _ 10r lL:c:J to gruncc a parole for a
t~rm extending beyond the sentence.

*

*

*

The laDguage of K.S.A. 20-2312
is plain and una~biguous.
The
statute supercedes any case law
pcrtaininy to the subject. (43P P.2d
at 143, 145)
Appellant relies heavily on Idaho cases in
hi~

argurncllt, particular StCJte v. Sandoval, 92 Idaho

8'.-3, 4'>2 P.:2d 3~0 (l'JC9), and Ex Parte 11edley, 73 Idaho
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474, 253 P.2d 794 (1953).

Respondent contends that

neither case applies here.

In Idaho, although probation

can be four times longer than imprisonment for a misdemeanor, the

rule is different for felonies where pro-

bation is limited by the maximum period of incarceration.
Both the Sandoval and Medley decisions involve felony
convictions and not a misdemeanor conviction as in the
instant case.

Obviously therefore, neither case is

authority for appellant's position.
Appellant further cites the Oklahoma case of
Ex Parte Eaton, 29 Okla. Crirn. 275, 233 P.781 (1925).
Suffice it to say that the pertinant Oklahoma statute
has bee:n revised.

Subsequent to 1970 the lav.' in Oklahoma

is that a proL;ltion period may be for as long as t\·IO
years (OS!\ 22

'19lc

(197C ) .
170 Ca.2d 596, 339 P.2d

20.2

(1959), a

appellant as authority.

That case simply states that if

no probation period is specified by the judge, the maximum
prison term becomes the period of probation.

It does not

stand for the proposition, as implied by appellant, that
probation could not be longer-

In fact, the California

courts have upheld a three year probation period in a
case where the maximum sentence Has 90 days.

(Pconlc v.

Heath, 72 Cal. Rptr. 457, 266 C.A.2d 754 (1968)).
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The only other authority cited by appellant is
Stnte v. Lard, 86 N.M. 71, 519 P.2d 307 (1974).

Respondent

adr'lits that in New 11exico a convicted person may not be
placed on probation for a longer period than he may be
i::1prisoned.

However, respondent points out that New

nexico along with Arizona and l·lashington are the only
three (out of fourteen)

western states that so hold.

Respondent submits that Utah should maintain its position
among those states that

~spouse

the majority view.

Appellant is correct, in his report of the
case L•·.: r.r. tr.e: subject, that when the trial court
fails tc S2Lc_f; the period of probation it is generally
held to be the same as the r.aximum sentence period.
ho~ever,

is not a case,

of an unspecified probation

This
pe~1od.

The trial court very specifically sentenced appellant to
'

>

'

•

:~

-

__.!._') :_

•

accepted that sentenc
IClHn II

;:'

l1TlVl Ll

B!,TION BE Lii:ITED BY :

'.''Jl

··uRE DID NOT INTEND THAT PRO-

.~:l'I'

:.CE PROVISIOI<S.

In his second aryument appellant goes to great
and imaginative lengths in attemptins to prove that the
Utah legislature, although not specifically so stating,
meant for probation periods to be limited by the incarceration provisions of the Code.

Respondent submits that a
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simple reading of the statute is more than sufficient
to convey the legislative intent.

As shown, supra,

the Utah legislature very clearly, and with great
supporting intent, meant for trial judges to have
wide discretion in probation matters.

In interpretir.g

statutes the court should assume that each word of a
statute was used advisedly and should be given epplication in accord with their usually accepted meaning
(Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100, 485
P.2d 1035 (1971).

Respondent submits that the following

words are very clear:
"Upon a plea of guilty or conviction.
the Court having jurisdiction.
may place the defendant
on probation for such period of ti~e
as the c::mrt shall determine." (Utah
C::JdE l'.n:-.otated § 77 35-17 {1953))
':J,::>:~c:~_c: added)

penalty and not a prj·;ilege.
of the truth.

\Vhen a ctan commits a crime and is adjud'!cc2

to be guilty he can l:" ..
jail or prison.

This is exJctly L.,c•.·,.J.c,i..;

S<

Jttenced to serve a time in

That would be the penalty for his actions.

Thereafter, as a privilege, granted for v1hatever hur1ar:e
reasons, the court may allov1 that man to be placed on
probation in lieu of incarceration.

Furtber~orc,

rc~pJndcnt

asks this court to take judicial notice that any rc.>'cc•r.1 l 1 ,.
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man would prefer as much as three years probation to
one year in prison confinement.
~ay

feels this
o~n

Obviously appellant

since he choose, voluntarily and of his

accord, one year's probation rather than six months

in jail.
Finally, appellant argues that a defendant
has certain rights while on probation.
as nuch.

stipula~cs

~owever,

Respondent

all of the "forward looking

due process concepts" under Norrisey v. Brewer and all
other cases cited by appellant, have absolutely nothing
to do with the length of probation.
where

th~

lt ~al,
,' l J '

tl

~his

is not a case

issue is a revocation hearing, notice, speedy

'·Titter: findings, or any of the other Horrisey
Jlt-

1,c

Utah legislature r,ay make the lav ,;:'.

tOn and they have wisely chosen to grant
=retion to solve that problem.

o;.Lnce U1ere is specific statutory authority
supt.Jorting the decision of the lo•.:er court, and since
Utal•'s statutes arc very similar to those of most other
stc>Les, respondent urges this court to affirm the decision
of the lowLr court.

Such affirrnc:tion \Wuld carry out the

intent of the legislature of Utah.
Rcsrectfully submitted,
VI~ m;m; B.
RO!'h'JEY
Attorney General

I'IILLT!\;1 \·i.

BARHETT

As:~i::L1nt ,\ttorney General
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